The improvement I'm suggesting is to account for the nominal rigidity of rents by looking at current market prices instead of average prices. The current practice is to survey households about their current rent expenditures, but most of these expenditures are based on leases that reflect prices which are set in the past. This is kind of (though obviously not entirely) like looking at changes in average household mortgage payments to gauge current housing market prices. A measurement based on market rents, in contrast, would reflect the prevailing market rents that are charged, and would therefore better reflect current housing market conditions.
We don't gather food price statistics by asking people what they paid for the goods in their pantry; we go look at what those goods are selling for on the market today. Seems weird that we don't do the same for rent prices.
If you haven't yet read this well-reasoned critique of the CAPE stock market valuation metric, you should.
The Shiller CAPE, as constructed by its proponents, utilizes inconsistent data. In this piece, I'm going to explain the inconsistency in rigorous accounting detail, and then share the results of a modified version of CAPE that eliminates it. I'm also going to illustrate the distortion that changes in dividend payout ratios create for CAPE.
"In 1960, about one in four renters paid more than 30 percent of income for housing. Today, one in two are cost burdened," according to the study, America's Rental Housing.
"Cost-burdened" means you're paying more than 30 percent of income for housing and "severely cost-burdened" means you're paying more than half. "By 2011, 28 percent of renters paid more than half their incomes for housing, bringing the number with severe cost burdens up by 2.5 million in just four years, to 11.3 million," according to the Harvard study, which was conducted with partial funding from the MacArthur Foundation.
See our statistics on rent as a fraction of income.
Well, there's a lot of evidence that fewer people are living in old-style, middle-class neighborhoods. You see this in American cities. Manhattan is far wealthier than before; Washington, D.C., is rapidly gentrifying. Meanwhile, places like Texas are absorbing more poor people, who are leaving places like California or New York. So I think we're seeing much more geographic segregation by income class.
I think there will be much larger numbers of people who live somewhat bohemian, [freelance] lifestyles, who culturally feel very upper-middle-class or even upper-class, but who don't have that much money. (Think of many parts of Brooklyn.) Those individuals will be financially precarious, but live happy, productive lives. How we evaluate that ethically is very tricky. Still, I think that's what we're going to see.
While homeowners have been able to reduce their monthly payments to the lowest level in decades via mortgage refinancing and cutting back on credit card usage, the FOR for renters has been on the rise.
Of course the most overburdened homeowners lost their homes and became renters which also brought down the financial obligations of aggregate homeowners.
It's a pretty tidy formulation and probably a decent way to think of economic growth and the cycles along the way.
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So far this year there have been 848,000 new jobs. Of those, 813,000 are part time jobs... To put it differently, an incredible 96% of the jobs added this year were part-time jobs.
Update: This seems like a funny way to calculate things. If we're going to use the CPS data, why not use the reported full-time and part-time employment measures directly. By that accounting the fraction of jobs created this year that are part-time is 59%. Still high, but not quite as stunning.
Update 2: Here's the problem with John's calculation: Part-Time for Economic Reasons (LNS12032194) + Usually Work Part Time Noneconomic Reasons (LNS12005977) does not equal Total Part Time Workers (LNS12600000). To his credit, that's a little surprising to me too.
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Mortgage market weirdness: Jumbo mortgage rates are lower than conventional mortgage rates.
Although median annual household income rose to $52,100 in June, from its recent inflation-adjusted trough of $50,700 in August 2011, it remained $2,400 lower — a 4.4 percent decline — than in June 2009, when the recession ended. This drop, combined with the 1.8 percent decline that occurred during the recession, leaves median household income 6.1 percent — or $3,400 — below its level in December 2007, when the economic slump began.
See also here.
Once again, increasing home prices is not the goal.
The goal of housing policy ought to be to bolster real living standards by making housing abundant and affordable without unduly siphoning resources off from other segments of the economy. If houses get cheaper, bigger, or better-located, that means real wages are rising — exactly what we want.
[QE] is definitely a pretty roundabout way of driving money into the real economy. Instead of putting the money directly to work, pay money to people who already have assets even more than their assets are currently trading for, in the hope that they'll put at least some of the money to work.
In a sidenote he addresses "helicopter money" AKA "QE for the people."
QE involves paying over a $ (or Pounds, or Yen) amount in return for an existing asset. This is a crucial feature, and accounts for many of the drawbacks — in particular that the policy benefits above all existing holders of assets. In theory, just handing money to everybody in the country is a more effective and equal way of acheiving its aims. But you don't have to be a hard-money Bundesbanker to be at least a little uncomfortable with where this might end up
QE via asset purchases does strike me as a very roundabout way of addressing a demand shortfall in a substantially consumer driven economy. But as the above post suggests, nothing else may be politically viable.
We just don't see the returns there that are adequate to incentivize us to continue to invest, [Bruce] Rose, 55, chief executive officer of Carrington Holding Co. LLC, said in an interview at his Aliso Viejo, California office. There's a lot of -- bluntly -- stupid money that jumped into the trade without any infrastructure, without any real capabilities and a kind of build-it-as-you-go mentality that we think is somewhat irresponsible.
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You don't see phase diagrams for housing everyday.
I forgot to point out this post by Calculated Risk earlier this week. He's using my housing inventory data to chart the trajectory of listings coming online this year. Inventory has come way down over the past couple of years and the big question is whether this winter will mark a bottom. If a lot of homes go on the market this spring, it probably indicates a bottom.
Where the missing demand comes from:
Household borrowing represents, in a very direct sense, a redistribution of purchasing power from savers to borrowers. So if we worry that oversaving by the rich may lead to an insufficiency of purchases [by poorer households], household borrowing is a natural place to look for a remedy. Sure enough, we find that beginning in the early 1980s, household borrowing began a secular rise that continued until the financial crisis.
Why that's a problem:
Suppose that the mechanism that reconciles inequality and adequate demand is household borrowing. Is that sustainable? After all, poorer households would have to borrow new purchasing power in every period in order to support demand for as long as inequality remains high.
How it messes with the role of banks in the economy:
We very explicitly ask banks to intermediate the deficit in demand, exhorting them to lend lend lend for macroeconomic reasons that are indifferent to microeconomic evaluations of solvency. We can have a banking system that performs the information work of credit analysis and lends appropriately, or we can have a banking system that overcomes deficiencies in demand. We cannot have both when great volumes of lending are continually required for structural reasons.
The elegance and insight density of this post is off the charts!
The Trillion dollar coin solution would work despite how silly it sounds. It's more likely that it'd be a bunch of million dollar coins though.
The problem with having the US Mint produce a single, one-trillion-dollar platinum coin so Timothy Geithner can deposit it at the Federal Reserve is that it seems plain ridiculous. Yes, much of the commentariat believes that the debt ceiling itself is ridiculous, but two colliding ridiculousses don't make a serious.
Whenever I talk with real estate agents, I ask why they think inventory is so low. A common answer is that people don't want to sell at the bottom. In a market with falling prices, sellers rush to list their homes, and inventory increases. But if sellers think prices have bottomed, then they believe they can be patient, and inventory declines. Another reason is that many homeowners are "underwater" on their mortgage and can't sell.
We'll definitely see US housing inventory hit a new low in January of 2013. I'd say we'll have reasonable confidence that it's a bottom if we see Y/Y inventory increases come May and June.
Most Americans in 2010 paid far less in total taxes — federal, state and local — than they would have paid 30 years ago. According to an analysis by The New York Times, the combination of all income taxes, sales taxes and property taxes took a smaller share of their income than it took from households with the same inflation-adjusted income in 1980.
Households earning more than $200,000 benefited from the largest percentage declines in total taxation as a share of income. Middle-income households benefited, too. More than 85 percent of households with earnings above $25,000 paid less in total taxes than comparable households in 1980.
Lower-income households, however, saved little or nothing. Many pay no federal income taxes, but they do pay a range of other levies, like federal payroll taxes, state sales taxes and local property taxes. Only about half of taxpaying households with incomes below $25,000 paid less in 2010.
The accompanying graphic is fantastic as well.
The economics blogosphere was invented in early 2005 by a retired technology executive in Southern California named Bill McBride.
This is no hyperbole. Before Calculated Risk the web was, at best, an ocean of message board commentary on mainstream media reporting. At worst it was a bunch of crazies and their conspiracy theories. CR's dive into the numbers behind the narrative yielded the data driven analysis we almost take for granted today.
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